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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

13 September 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Special Operational Exercises

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article proposes that special operational exercises be held prior to front command-staff exercises in order to work out individual problems in detail, particularly those of the combat employment and control of the rocket troops and aviation and the air defense troops and fighter aviation, and also problems of setting up and moving control posts. On the basis of his experience in the Kiev Military District, the author provides a comprehensive description of the organization of these exercises, the allocation of appropriate personnel for participation in them, and the designation of tasks and methods of accomplishing them, with specific attention given to the preparation and delivery of nuclear strikes. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (72) for 1964. [redacted]

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[redacted]

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned [redacted]

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William W. Wells

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

DATE OF INFO. Mid-1964

DATE 13 September 197

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Special Operational Exercises

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (72) for 1964 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is General-Mayor N. Reut. This article proposes that special operational exercises be held prior to front command-staff exercises in order to work out individual problems in detail, particularly those of the combat employment and control of the rocket troops and aviation and the air defense troops and fighter aviation, and also problems of setting up and moving control posts. On the basis of his experience in the Kiev Military District, the author provides a comprehensive description of the organization of these exercises, the allocation of appropriate personnel for participation in them, and the designation of tasks and methods of accomplishing them, with specific attention given to the preparation and delivery of nuclear strikes. 50X1-HUM

End of Summary

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Comment:

The author also wrote "Planning the Initial Front Offensive" in Issue No. 1 (89) for 1970

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Special Operational Exercises

by

General-Mayor N. Reut

The development of the means of armed warfare, the nature of nuclear war and new views on how it should be conducted, the changes in the organizational structure of the troops and staffs, and the frequent personnel changes occurring in the control organs and in the troops necessitate further improvement of the existing operational training methods and the search for new, more expedient ones.

The problems associated with operational training have already been discussed in numerous articles. Very useful, we believe, are the propositions presented by General-Leytenant V. Mernov* and a group of generals and officers of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces** regarding the organization of operational training. However, the operational training methods examined in these and other articles apply to a great extent to the training of the individual assigned personnel of a single control organ, for example, of a front or army control organ, whereas under present-day conditions it is also necessary to improve teamwork among the levels of various control organs exercising troop control during an operation.

The reason for this is that the operational command has at its disposal highly diverse modern means of warfare which, if employed jointly and skilfully, produce a successful operation. However, this requires a high degree of coordination among all the levels of command exercising the control of these means.

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*Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 3 (64), 1962. (IRONBARK series [redacted]) 50X1-HUM

**Information Collection of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces No. 1, 1962.

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It is the lack of teamwork among the individual levels, starting with the headquarters of the front and ending with the executors of the commands in the rocket troops, the air defense troops, and aviation, that often results in a number of problems not being fully worked out during front command-staff exercises to which troops are allocated. Problems of this kind are the control of the rocket troops and aviation when they deliver coordinated strikes with nuclear and chemical warheads; the control of the air defense troops and fighter aviation when they are destroying the air enemy; the control of the forces and means allocated for the protection of the troops and organs in the rear area against the enemy means of mass destruction, and the organization of this protection; the control of the forces and means in warfare against the radioelectronic means of the enemy; the control of the rear, etc.

We believe that, to correct this situation, it is necessary in advance of the operational exercises to first work out each of these problems in special front (army) exercises under the direction of the combined-arms commander. These problems should receive final and complete elaboration at the general front (army) command-staff exercise.

Thus, to improve operational training and to eliminate the shortcomings in troop control that keep being repeated from year to year, we believe that the time has come to authorize and hold special front (army) exercises to work out the problems of the control of the rocket troops and aviation when they are organizing and inflicting destruction on the enemy on the ground; of the air defense troops and fighter aviation when they are destroying the air enemy; of the OSNAZ and SPETSNAZ units when they are organizing reconnaissance and neutralizing the radioelectronic means of the enemy, of the rear organs during the operation, and of each branch arm when it is organizing protection against weapons of mass destruction.

A reservation should be made, however, that special exercises must not be held above and beyond the total number of exercises with troops authorized by the Minister of Defense. It is therefore sometimes advisable to combine the general and separate staff training practices with the planned troop exercises, at which corresponding problems of control are also worked out. It is especially true that several of the exercises,

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for example, those on deploying and relocating control posts and other posts, are not intrinsically different from staff training practices on the terrain with communications means.

Army operational exercises involving the participation of a certain number of troops would not be without value. Of course, not all the military districts have training grounds on which exercises of this kind can be held, so there is no reason for having a large number of troops in the command-staff exercises. Moreover, it is difficult for the director of the exercise and for the staff of the directing body to train several staffs and the troops simultaneously. To do this requires a considerable umpiring organization.

A special front operational exercise for the rocket troops and aviation has become necessary in order to work out the problems of the steady control of the basic means of destruction at all levels, from the headquarters of the front down to the launch battery and the aviation flight. It is particularly important that the following problems be worked out: the organization of stable communications; the decision of the front (army) commander to deliver strikes employing nuclear, chemical, and conventional means of destruction; the assignment of tasks to deliver strikes and to give commands to the direct executors; the training of the direct executors to deliver strikes; the organization of all-round support of the actions carried out by the rocket troops and aviation, as well as the organization of the actual supply of missiles; the relieving of the battle formations of the rocket troops; the rebasing of aviation; and the relieving of the control posts without disrupting the stable control of the troops.

Exercises of this kind were held repeatedly in the Kiev Military District with the following participants: the chiefs of the rocket troops and artillery of the military district and armies, together with their staffs and departments of missile and artillery armament; missile brigades and separate missile battalions of district subordination at reduced strength, but with no fewer than four to six launch batteries with training simulators in each brigade and two to three batteries in each battalion; front and army missile technical units with the necessary equipment for the transporting of missiles; the headquarters of the air army at reduced personnel strength; and

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reconnaissance aviation and the commanders of the large units (units) of the air army with small operations groups and the necessary number of aircraft to check on the execution of the commands.

To work out the problems of planning the employment of nuclear weapons and the cooperation of the front troops, the following were also allocated for the exercise: the operations and intelligence directorates; the communications directorate and those chiefs of the branch arms and services of the military district who directly or indirectly are involved in resolving problems of the control or support of the actions of the rocket troops and aviation; and also the commanders of armies with a small number of operations officers, intelligence officers, communications officers, and with the appropriate chiefs of the branch arms and services of the armies. Also participating in the exercise were military district and army communications units and mobile control posts at reduced personnel strength.

One may pose the question: how do these exercises differ from the conventional command-staff exercises? With regard to the participants and methods of organization, they actually do greatly resemble the conventional command-staff exercises. But the point is that in the special exercises only individual problems are worked out in detail, in this case only those connected with the combat employment and control of the rocket troops and aviation.

Each exercise of this kind usually began with the alerting of the staffs and troops by a combat alert signal, the subsequent moving out and deployment of them in the designated areas, and the organization of stable communications at all levels. Work was then done on questions of organizing and delivering massed (grouped, single) nuclear strikes by the rocket troops and aviation for the purpose of repulsing the enemy attack with troops which had been transferred to the front and which were conducting a defensive engagement; defeating the main enemy grouping immediately before the main front forces were committed to the engagement from the march to develop the offensive; defeating the enemy counterattack groupings during the operation; and destroying newly detected enemy means of nuclear attack, aircraft at the airfields, control posts, and the most important bases and depots. At the same time work was done on questions of

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cooperation among the rocket troops, aviation, and all branch arms of the front ground forces, and on the all-round support of the actions of aviation and the rocket troops with the forces and means of the special troops and services.

At a designated time and on pre-arranged signals, reconnaissance aircraft were sent out to the assigned areas and from on board transmitted reconnaissance data about the enemy by radio. These data were received on radio receivers in the intelligence departments and in the staffs of the rocket troops and artillery of the front and the armies, and also in the staff of the air army. The data were immediately brought to the operations buses of the commanders of the front and armies. There operations officers plotted the data on the general situation map. Plotted earlier on the map were the siting areas and the lines denoting the range of the missile units and aviation. Reports were also prepared on the availability in each missile brigade and aviation regiment of ready nuclear warheads, and also on the number of nuclear warheads planned for carrying out the given task.

After analyzing the situation plotted on the map and studying the combat capabilities of the rocket troops and aviation, the commander of the front designated the targets to be destroyed by nuclear (chemical) means and assigned tasks to the chief of the rocket troops and the commander of the air army to deliver the strikes.

During the exercises, primary attention was given to working out the following methods of delivering massed nuclear strikes.

The first method is the delivery of a strike only by order of the front. In this case, the front commander personally designated the targets to be destroyed by nuclear (chemical) means; he allocated these targets among the missile brigades and aviation and indicated to each front and army missile brigade (battalion) and aviation unit the ground zeroes, the yield of the warheads, and the time to be ready to deliver the nuclear strikes.

After designating the targets to be destroyed and allocating them among the missile brigades and aviation, the chiefs of the rocket troops of the front and the commander of the air army came

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to the operations bus of the front commander to receive their task. They brought with them trained officers to take down the coordinates of the ground zeroes from the map and to fill out the authorization forms for the delivery of strikes and then deliver them to the officers responsible for encoding and transmitting the commands to the executors. When the chief of the rocket troops was assigned his tasks, he had indicated to him the ground zeroes, the type of burst, the yield of the warheads, and the time to be ready for the delivery of each nuclear strike. The chief of the front rocket troops and artillery (the commander of the air army) indicated the launch battery (squadron, flight) assigned the task of delivering the strike and monitored the accomplishment of this task by filling in an authorization form for each strike and presenting it to the front commander for signature. The signed authorization form was then delivered quickly to the officers, who encoded the commands and sent them immediately by radio to the missile brigades, battalions, and launch batteries. The latter then prepared to launch the missiles.

Altogether it took from 1.5 to two hours to receive the reconnaissance data from the aircraft, to have the front commander make the decision for a single massed strike with 36 to 42 nuclear warheads, to take down the coordinates, fill out the authorization forms, encode the orders, transmit them to the launch battery (squadron, flight) and have the latter prepare for the launch (sortie). It took up to 30 minutes of this time to receive the reconnaissance data from the aircraft and to have the commander of the front make the decision for a massed strike, and from one to 1.5 hours to assign tasks at all the levels, from the front to the launch battery (flight) inclusively, and to receive a report on the readiness to deliver nuclear (chemical) strikes at the same time.

To reduce the time required to transmit and receive commands, a radio receiver was allocated to each launch battery. The receiver was switched in to the radio net (radio link) of the chief of the front (army) rocket troops and artillery. This ensured that the commanders of the batteries, the battalions, and the brigade received the commands simultaneously, and made it possible to reduce the transmission time by 15 to 20 minutes. Of course, this required a high degree of cooperation among the radio operators at all levels, from the battery to the front,

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inclusively.

Tasks were assigned similarly in the air army.

The second method is the delivery of the strike by order of the front and the armies. In this case, the commander of the front troops designated the targets to be destroyed with nuclear (chemical) warheads and allocated the tasks among the front missile brigades (battalions), and the combined-arms, tank, and air armies. Then he personally indicated to the missile units and the air army the ground zeroes, the yield of the warheads, and the time each nuclear (chemical) strike was to be delivered. At the same time, the targets to be destroyed, the number of warheads, and the time for delivering the nuclear (chemical) strikes were designated for each army by the operations directorate of the front staff. In this instance, the commanders of the armies were themselves given the opportunity to designate the ground zeroes and the yield of the nuclear warheads for the army missile brigades, and in some cases for the missile battalions of the divisions.

The work of the commanders of the armies and the chiefs of the front and army rocket troops was conducted in the same manner as the delivery of the strikes was organized in the first method although somewhat less time was used (approximately one to 1.5 hours). It was necessary, however, that the front and the armies have exactly the same information about the enemy.

The advantage of this method was that the commanders of the armies, who frequently are more familiar with the actual situation and have more specific information about the enemy targets, participated directly in the control of the rocket troops.

The third method is the delivery of the strike by order of the armies. In this case, the front commander designated the targets and the total number of nuclear (chemical) warheads needed to destroy them, then allocated the targets and warheads among the armies. In so doing the front rocket troops and the aircraft of the air army were made operationally subordinate to the combined-arms and tank armies for the period of the delivery of the nuclear strikes. After receiving orders from the front commander, the commanders of these armies assigned tasks to their

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respective (army) missile brigades, motorized rifle and tank divisions, and to the front means allocated to them (directly to the missile and aviation large units or through the commander of the air army and the chief of the front rocket troops and artillery).

This method took considerably more time than when the front commander assigned the tasks directly to the front means. Still, we believe that this method cannot be rejected as being useless. At times, it too can be employed, for example, if the front should find it difficult to select ground zeroes for the bursts, if the position of its troops near the targets selected for destruction by nuclear (chemical) weapons should be unclear, etc. With approximately the same method, it also is possible in some instances to work out the delivery of nuclear (chemical) strikes to destroy newly detected enemy nuclear attack means, aircraft, control posts, and other important targets that must be destroyed as soon as they are detected.

During the exercise, work was done with the missile technical units on the problems of preparing and delivering missiles to the siting areas of the missile brigades, and on rerouting missiles from one brigade to another in the course of shipment. The chiefs of the branch arms and services in turn worked on resolving problems of providing all-round support for the actions of their troops.

The methods, worked out in the special exercises, for the control of the rocket troops and aviation also were widely employed during the front command-staff exercise and made it considerably easier to carry out and achieve the assigned goals. The experience of these exercises enables us to make several proposals on how best to plan the employment of nuclear weapons during an operation, how to reduce the time needed to organize and deliver nuclear strikes, and what is the best organizational structure of the rocket troops. Judging from the experience of the exercises, there is no sense in "embellishing" the plan of an operation with planned nuclear strikes with their ground zeroes, types of bursts, yield of warheads, and even time of delivery indicated, since, as a rule, it is unrealistic to determine this data in advance.

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It would be much better if the plan of the operation were to reflect the operational tasks to be carried out with the employment of nuclear and chemical warheads, the number of these warheads, the time limits for preparing, assembling, and delivering them to the units, and the availability of a reserve. The front commander would determine specifically the ground zero, type, yield, and time of delivery of each nuclear strike as the time approaches for the execution of the operational task.

Consequently, the planning of the employment of nuclear weapons should be carried out in two stages. The first is the preliminary planning stage, which would provide for allocating nuclear warheads according to the tasks and for readying the warheads. The second stage would occur right at the time each operational task is being carried out, when the target, ground zero, type of burst, yield, and the time of delivery of each strike have already been specifically determined.

This kind of planning will rid the operational documents of superfluous drawings and do away with the need to draw up a completely useless special nuclear strike delivery map.

A period of one to 1.5 hours to organize and deliver a massed nuclear strike when highly mobile actions are being conducted is intolerable. The enemy could change the location of his installations in this amount of time. Therefore, it is necessary to seek in every way possible to considerably reduce the time needed to organize the delivery of strikes and to assign the tasks to the executors. As the experience of the exercises has shown, this is now the principal task in the system of operational training. What is needed primarily is the direct transmission of commands from the staff of the front rocket troops to the commander of each launch battery. The functions of the commanders of the brigades and battalions in this case will be limited mainly to monitoring. Approximately the same type of situation is observed during organization of the relocation of rocket troops, when the commanders and the staffs of the missile brigades and battalions often turn out to be merely intermediate levels for relaying orders transmitted from the staffs of the rocket troops and artillery of the front and armies. Consequently, the question arises as to whether it would not be better to remove one of the intermediate levels in the rocket troops (the brigade or the battalion) and to try to find a more

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expedient organizational structure for them. We can hardly agree with the claim made by several authors of articles of the infallability of the existing organization of the rocket troops of the ground forces. On the contrary, the experience of the exercises has shown that this organization of the rocket troops is not the best and that it does not fully ensure their efficient employment during a present-day operation.

The need to conduct a special front exercise for the air defense troops and fighter aviation also was occasioned by the requirement to work out the problems of controlling these means when conducting reconnaissance against the air enemy, in destroying his aviation, cruise missiles and airborne landing forces while in flight, and in disrupting his airlifts. The need to work out these problems at the front level has arisen from the increase in the relative proportion of combat against the enemy in the air and from the need for centralized control of the air defense troops and aviation.

It can be stated without exaggeration that the success of combat in the air during a front operation under present-day conditions will often also predetermine the success of the actions of the ground forces.

The following can be allocated for a special front air defense exercise: the chiefs of the air defense troops of all levels, together with their air defense command post; the surface-to-air missile, antiaircraft artillery, and radiotechnical units of the air defense troops of the military district, armies and divisions; the commander of the air army and his staff at reduced strength; units of fighter and reconnaissance aviation, as well as a small number of air units to represent the actions of the air enemy. The operations and intelligence directorates, the communications directorate, the chiefs of the branch arms and services of the military district and the commanders of the armies with the necessary number of staff officers, and also the military district and army communications units, may also participate in working out the problems of the cooperation of air defense troops and fighter aviation with the other front troops, in providing all-round support for the actions of the air defense troops, and in giving assistance in conducting the exercise.

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Using a pre-arranged signal, all the staffs and units participating in the exercise can be alerted by combat alert signal and moved out to the departure areas, where they must swiftly deploy and set up stable control. Then work can be done on the problems of conducting reconnaissance of the air enemy, of warning their own troops about the enemy's actions, of plotting targets at the air defense command posts of the front and the armies, of allocating the targets to be destroyed by the air defense troops of the front and by fighter aviation, of assigning tasks to the troops, of monitoring their execution, etc.

Work can also be done during the exercise on the problems of the cooperation between the air defense forces and means of the front and the front-area army (corps) of the Air Defense of the Country in repulsing massed enemy air attacks and destroying group and individual targets. In addition, work can be done on the problems of relocating the air defense troops, rebasing fighter aviation, relieving the control posts, and on the whole, on the methods of controlling the forces and means in destroying the air enemy.

Long range aviation training flights, civil aviation flights, and various exercises with air units that are going on at the time can be employed to represent enemy air attacks.

Work on the problems of repulsing the initial massed enemy air attack at the start of a war can also be carried out in joint exercises with the Air Defense Forces of the Country*. In this case when the alert signal is given, the air defense troops and the fighter aviation of the military district can occupy the areas assigned to them and work jointly with the Air Defense Forces of the Country on the problems of destroying the air enemy and of cooperation.

Warfare against the enemy's radioelectronic means assumes great significance under present-day conditions. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to organize and hold special front two-sided exercises in which problems would have to be worked out on controlling the forces and means when this kind of warfare is waged during a front operation. Such exercises also are necessary for gaining experience in employing those forces and means which can be allocated for this kind of warfare, and to

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*These exercises have recently come to be conducted systematically and are very useful.

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seek the most expedient ways of controlling them. Moreover, the special exercises provide the opportunity for working out in more detail the problems involved in organizing protection against the enemy's use of the same kind of means.

Unfortunately, these problems currently are receiving little attention in the combined-arms exercises. Usually they are left to the specialists, while the combined-arms chiefs and their staffs basically disassociate themselves from solving them.

This cannot happen in the special exercises, and for this reason they will be very useful.

The following can be included in a special front exercise: the ninth departments of the staffs of the military district and the armies; some of the officers from the intelligence and communications directorates, the air defense, and the staff of the air army; and all the radio reconnaissance and jamming units. The operations directorate at reduced strength, chiefs of the branch arms and services, the commanders of the armies with the necessary number of officers from the staffs, branch arms, and services, can also be allocated to assist in conducting the exercise and in working out the problems of planning and cooperation.

The enemy must be represented by the appropriate staffs and control posts to control troops and means of attack including aviation. Troop control on both sides must be carried out mainly by radio.

The following problems can be worked out during the exercise: conducting reconnaissance of the enemy's radioelectronic means and disrupting control by them when he delivers massed nuclear strikes at the time that the front troops are being committed to an engagement from the march, when we are destroying the attack grouping of the enemy, when we are making assault crossings of rivers, and when the front troops are carrying out other operational tasks during an operation; the methods of countering the enemy in his warfare against our radioelectronic means and the organization of protection of our means.

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The experience of exercises shows that when there is an improvement in the methods of employing means of mass destruction, the methods of protection against them also change. Consequently, in order to carry out measures for the protection of the troops, continuously greater use is being made of the forces and means often at the disposal of the various command levels. This is why it has become necessary to search further for methods of organizing protection and to hold special front exercises to work out the problems of the control of all the forces and means allocated for this purpose.

The headquarters of the military district, armies, divisions and units at full or reduced strength can be allocated for these exercises to work out the following problems: the collection and collation of data on the areas against which the enemy has delivered strikes with means of mass destruction, as well as data about their yield, time, and results; the forecast of the radiation (chemical) situation, and the reporting of forecast data to the troops; the organization of radiation, chemical, and medical reconnaissance; the control of forces and means allocated for this purpose; the reporting of reconnaissance data to the troops; the making of decisions to move the troops out of the contaminated zones and threatened areas; the search for and conducting by all the chiefs of the branch arms and services of measures to eliminate the aftereffects of the means of mass destruction employed by the enemy; the working out of the necessary documentation on all these matters and the assignment of tasks to the troops. These problems can also be worked on in other special front exercises, provided that the main command personnel participate.

In the Kiev Military District, therefore, the problems of protecting the troops from means of mass destruction were worked out during an operational exercise held by the air defense troops of the military district (army) and an army of the Air Defense of the Country. Mainly the methods of controlling the air defense forces and means in repulsing massed enemy air attacks in the initial period of a war were improved in this exercise.

We also consider it advisable to carry out a special operational rear exercise to work out the problems of controlling the front rear, army rear, and tactical rear during a front operation. It should also be noted that currently these

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exercises unfortunately are a rarity, despite the fact that the means of mass destruction and the full motorization of the troops have made the success of the operation dependent, in even greater measure than previously, on the careful and coordinated work of the rear organs. Moreover, the very process of rear support has become considerably more difficult.

Experience has shown that the special rear exercises need not include all the rear units and services, as was done in the Carpathian Military District in 1960. It is quite possible to limit participation to the rear control organs in the front, the army, and the divisions by allocating the commanders of the appropriate units and the chiefs of the services. After all, the main purpose of these exercises is to improve the teamwork of the control of the rear and to work out the problems of coordinating the work of all its elements.

A special front exercise for setting up and relocating the control posts is very useful in the training of the control organs, helping them to acquire mobility in setting up, closing down, and relocating. In addition, it is of great value in training the personnel of the front, army, and the division communications units, and in enabling staff personnel to acquire skills in working at communications means.

Mobile control posts and communications units of the front, the armies, and the divisions, as well as staffs at reduced strength -- mainly persons directly involved in conversations on the communications means -- can be allocated for this exercise.

The following problems can be worked out with the participants of the exercise: alerting by combat alert signal; the setting up of control posts in designated areas and the organization of communications within a brief time period; the reciprocal exchange of information among all the staffs and services about the situation using all the types of communications; the transfer of control from one post to another; the closing down of control posts and their relocation to new areas. In addition, such problems as moving the control posts out of zones of radioactive contamination or threatened areas can also be worked out.

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The experience of similar exercises conducted in the Kiev Military District showed that each control post must have in advance its crew of personnel, motor transport, and communications means, so that troop control is not disrupted when a move is made from a threatened area or zone of contamination. The following variants can be stipulated:

-- first, the control post, including the communications means, is closed down and relocated at full strength to another area; we will employ this variant in the event that it is possible to transfer control from the main post to an alternate or forward post or to one of the subordinate staffs, and if there is enough time before the approach of the radioactive cloud for this to be done;

-- second, only part of the control post and part of the communications means are closed down and moved to a safe area, depending on the expected levels of radiation; only a small part of the communications personnel can be left behind to close down the communications means (they then must go through decontamination treatment); we will use this variant in cases where time does not permit us to close down immediately and move the entire complement of the control post quickly;

-- third, the control post is closed down and moved to the safe area in a piecemeal fashion; in this case troop control continues to be carried out in the former area until it is set up in the new area; this variant is possible when there is sudden contamination by the enemy in the control post deployment area.

We have examined the possible special operational exercises which ought to precede the main front two-level and three-level command-staff exercise. During this exercise, all the problems worked out during the special exercises undoubtedly will receive further improvement.

Another of the useful measures of operational training is the conducting of an army two-sided operational exercise, if possible with the allocation of some of the troops. This exercise is needed in order to do practical work on the problems

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of the employment of the means of destruction at the disposal of the army command in conjunction with actual troop actions, and also in order to train the staffs of the armies to control the operating troops, to sense their needs, and to show concern for them. Such an exercise held in the Kiev Military District in 1963 achieved this goal. In this exercise they were successful in virtually tying together the tasks of operational and combat training, and in checking the operational and tactical troop operating methods actually being employed. Additionally, the operational staffs received practice in the control of troops who were actually operating.

Of course, as we observed earlier, these exercises can be conducted when a small number of troops are allocated for them.* Nonetheless, as experience has shown, they are extremely useful.

Operational means of destruction have become decisive during the conduct of an operation, and thus require the reciprocal coordination of operational and tactical operating methods. This can be achieved only through joint operational and tactical exercises.

A two-sided exercise of this kind was held in the Kiev Military District in 1963. On each side there was one army headquarters with army units and an army missile brigade, two divisions at reduced strength, and the operations groups of the staffs of two more divisions. The air army supported the actions of each army with a part of its forces. This exercise revealed also that the staffs of the armies had already begun to lose the skills they had acquired earlier in controlling operating troops. Consequently, a gap occurred in the methods of troop control at the operational and tactical levels.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the article has presented only a few considerations on the advisability of conducting special front operational exercises to work out certain troop control problems. In this connection, it is not at

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*The size of the training grounds in the military districts on the average allows one division at reduced strength to operate on one side.

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all necessary for a military district to plan and hold the entire system of special front operational exercises every year. The military district can confine itself to part of them; however, it is desirable that these exercises be held every two or three years, so that the skills acquired in them not be lost.

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